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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Albert Einstein is (perhaps erroneously) credited with having
said: “The woman who follows the crowd will usually go no further
than the crowd. The woman who walks alone is likely to find herself
in places no one has ever been before.” 1 But this dichotomy leaves
out the fortune of a woman who meaningfully participates in the
crowd. Moreover, it leaves out the effect of the woman’s behavior on
the crowd itself.
* W.P. Toms Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of
Law. New York University School of Law, J.D. 1985; Brown University, A.B. 1982. Thanks
are owed (and gratefully given) to Chad J. Talbot, The University of Tennessee College
of Law 2016, for his able research assistance and to The University of Tennessee College
of Law for providing summer funding in support of the work on this Article.
1. The quote is attributed to Albert Einstein on the GoodReads website. Quote by
Albert Einstein, GOOD READS, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/157357-the-woman-who
-follows-the-crowd-will-usually-go-no, archived at http://perma.cc/AYP8-4XT6 (last visited
Nov. 4, 2014). That attribution, however, is called into question on the Quote Investigator
website. The One Who Follows the Crowd Will Usually Go No Further Than the Crowd,
QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, http://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/10/18/follows-crowd/, archived
at http://perma.cc/6CGJ-UWVJ (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). Regardless of the origin of the
quote, it presents an appropriate jumping-off point for the thoughts shared in this Article.
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History, theory, and research outcomes indicate that crowds have
the capacity to behave differently from the individuals that constitute them. A person may cast aside or suppress his or her individual
identity in favor of a crowd identity.2 A crowd member may adopt
group behaviors because he or she is susceptible and the behaviors
are infectious,3 because he or she has commonalities that are
reinforced in the crowd,4 or because his or her association with the
crowd leads to jointly held norms that dictate or otherwise affect
behavior.5 Gender differences may impact these dynamics.6
Very interesting, you (might) say. But . . . so what? Who cares?
For those of us who pay attention to gender diversity on corporate
boards of directors, there may be some learning that can come from
this body of work. Specifically, if corporate boards of directors are
crowds, then the observations from this body of theoretical and
empirical work may provide valuable information about the role of
women as members of those boards of directors.
Since 1994, the year in which the William & Mary Journal of
Women and the Law was first published, women have become larger
2. S. D. Reicher, ‘The Battle of WestminsterNovember 6, 2014’: Developing the Social
Identity Model of Crowd Behaviour in Order to Explain the Initiation and Development
of Collective Conflict, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 116 (1996) (“[T]he shift from individual to group behaviour involves a shift from personal to social identity and hence the
emergence of cultural standards as a basis for behavioural control.”).
3. See GUSTAVE LE BON, THE CROWD: A STUDY OF THE POPULAR MIND 15 (Kitchener
2001) (1986), available at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/lebon/Crowds
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5SJR-KVE8.
4. See FLOYD ALLPORT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 202 (1924); ERICH GOODE, COLLECTIVE
BEHAVIOR 58 (1992).
[T]he way people act in crowds or publics is an expression or outgrowth of
who they are ordinarily. . . . [L]ike-minded people come together in, or
converge on, a certain location where collective behavior can and will take
place, where individuals can act out tendencies or traits that they had in the
first place.
Id.
5. See RALPH H. TURNER & LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 83–84 (1957).
6. See, e.g., ROSE CHALLENGER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CROWD BEHAVIOURS:
SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 130 (Mark Leigh ed., 2009), available at https://www.gov.uk
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192606/understanding_crowd
_behaviour-supporting-evidence.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YA46-6J9B (consciously
referencing gender, and not sex, differences because the referenced distinctions between
men and women are behavioral or social rather than biological (although they may have
roots in human biology)); Jayde Pryzgoda & Joan C. Chrisler, Definitions of Gender and
Sex: The Subtleties of Meaning, 43 SEX ROLES 553, 554 (2000) (“ ‘Sex’ has come to refer
to the biological aspects of being male and female. ‘Gender’ typically refers only to behavioral, social, and psychological characteristics of men and women.”); Gary R. Webb et al.,
An Examination of Gender Roles in Crowds 1-21, at 14 (Univ. of Del. Disaster Research
Ctr., Preliminary Paper #231, 1995), available at http://dspace.udel.edu/bitstream/handle
/19716/639/PP231.pdf?sequence=1, archived at http://perma.cc/V2P5-5GC3.
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players on boards of directors (and in corporate management more
generally).7 Women now also constitute a significantly higher share
of new director nominees in the United States than they have in the
past.8 Yet, there is evidence that the rate of growth of women’s
board participation has slowed in recent years—and in any event, the
growth rate has not been high over the intervening years.9 The aggregate data are mixed and offer no cause for overall optimism,
although some data points do indicate progress.10
This is, for most who follow board diversity or composition
studies, a somewhat old and tired story. With the thought that new
perspectives often can be helpful, this Article approaches an analysis
of women’s roles on corporate boards of directors from the standpoint
of crowd theory. Crowd theory—in reality, a group of theories—explains the behavior of people in crowds. Specifically, this Article
describes theories of the crowd from social psychology and applies
them to the literature on female corporate directors, looking at the
effects on both women as crowd members and boards as decisionmaking crowds.
7. See, e.g., Dan R. Dalton & Catherine M. Dalton, Women and Corporate Boards of
Directors: The Promise of Increased, and Substantive, Participation in the Post SarbanesOxley Era, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 257, 259 (2010) (citing data showing an increase in the number and percentage of female directors of Fortune 500 firms from 1993 to June 2009);
JUDITH WARNER, THE WOMEN’S LEADERSHIP GAP 2 (Ctr. for Am. Progress 2014), available
at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/WomenLeadership.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y8A6-4LGT (“From 1997 to 2009, women’s share of board seats
in S&P 1500 companies increased 7.2 percentage points, or 94 percent, and their share of
top executive positions increased by 2.8 percentage points, or 86 percent. The share of
companies with female CEOs increased more than six-fold.”).
8. EDWARD KAMONJOH, GENDER DIVERSITY ON BOARDS: A REVIEW OF GLOBAL TRENDS
10 (2014), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/2014-iss-global
-board-diversity-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3FCN-447U.
9. See, e.g., RACHEL SOARES ET AL., 2013 CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 500 WOMEN
BOARD DIRECTORS 1, CATALYST (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2013
-catalyst-census-fortune-500-women-board-directors, archived at http://perma.cc/NJL2
-ADBX (revealing that women held 16.6% of board seats in the Fortune 500 in 2012 and
16.9% in 2013); Dalton & Dalton, supra note 7, at 259 (noting growth rates of .46% from
1993 through 2001 and .51% from 2002 through 2009).
10. See, e.g., Dalton & Dalton, supra note 7, at 257 (noting “pervasive disappointment” with stagnant growth rates, yet also presenting data that gives cause for some
optimism); Penny Pritzker, Remarks at Global Conference on Women in the Boardroom
(Sept. 16, 2014) (transcript available at http://commerce.gov/news/secretary-speeches
/2014/09/16/us-secretary-commerce-penny-pritzker-delivers-remarks-global-conf,
archived at http://perma.cc/RJX5-DZ4V) (“Many of you . . . . have seen the boardroom
change for the better; yet you know that we are still a long way from equality of
opportunity in corporate leadership.”); Mary Jo White, Completing the Journey: Women
as Directors of Public Companies (Sept. 16, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.sec
.gov/news/speech/detail/speech/1370542961053#.VCDaykvFru; archived at http://www
.perma.cc/9WYP-GECR) (noting progress over the years but remarking generally that
“[o]ur position internationally does not demonstrate leadership . . . .”).
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I. THE CONCEPT OF A CROWD
What, exactly, is a crowd? Is a crowd different from other groups,
and if so, in what way or ways is it different? How do crowds behave?
How do men and women in crowds behave? Answering these questions is critical to an assessment of the propriety and value of a crowd
theory analysis of boards of directors and their male and female
members.
A. Defining the Crowd
Establishing a clear definition of the collection of individuals to
which crowd theory applies is not as easy as it sounds. Crowd theorists and commentators typically define and describe the crowd in
comprehensive terms. In his recent book popularizing crowd theory,
author James Surowiecki uses the term to describe any group of
people who have “the ability to act collectively to make decisions and
solve problems[.]” 11 Gustave Le Bon, perhaps best described as the
founding father of crowd theory, similarly conceptualizes a crowd
broadly to include decision-making groups of various sizes, compositions, and types.12 However, Le Bon more precisely defines a crowd
by its psychological profile:
From the psychological point of view the expression “crowd”
assumes quite a different signification. Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from
those of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas
of all the persons in the gathering take one and the same
direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. A collective
mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but presenting very clearly
defined characteristics. The gathering has thus become what, in
the absence of a better expression, I will call an organised crowd,
or, if the term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It
forms a single being, and is subjected to the law of the mental
unity of crowds.13
11. JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS xvii (First Anchor Books 2005).
12. See LE BON, supra note 3, at 13–14.
13. Id. Le Bon further notes, in sum:
Whoever be the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike be their
mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, the fact
that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in possession of a
sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner
quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think,
and act were he in a state of isolation. There are certain ideas and feelings
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Preferred dictionary definitions take a narrower approach, often
focusing on the need for a group to include many individuals to
constitute a crowd.14 Yet, researchers have studied crowds that have
relatively few members.15 A number of scholars and other commentators assume the existence of a crowd in their work.16
A prominent modern crowd theorist notes that the crowd has
historically been defined by reference to its function in society.17 The
crowd was the “other” for members of political, intellectual, and artistic elites, who saw the crowd as a threat to their power or authority.18
[I]f the masses in general were seen as a potential threat to the
status quo, the crowd was the mass in action. It was the potential
catastrophe made actual. And so the crowd became a dense
symbol which regrouped all the bourgeois fears and fantasies of
chaos. If social discipline seemed under threat from alcoholism,
the crowd was characterised as drunken, either metaphorically
or literally. If the patriarchal order seemed under assault from
independent women, the crowd was described metaphorically as
feminine . . . .19
which do not come into being, or do not transform themselves into acts
except in the case of individuals forming a crowd. The psychological crowd is
a provisional being formed of heterogeneous elements, which for a moment
are combined, exactly as the cells which constitute a living body form by
their reunion a new being which displays characteristics very different from
those possessed by each of the cells singly.
Id. at 15.
14. See, e.g., Crowd, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/crowd,
archived at http://perma.cc/MU5B-AKLQ (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (“[A] large number
of persons gathered closely together; throng: ‘a crowd of angry people.’ ”); Crowd, THE
FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/crowd, archived at http://www.perma
.cc/QQE4-T8JB (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (“A large number of persons gathered together;
a throng.”); Crowd, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/crowd, archived at http://perma.cc/V84W-N79T (“[A] large number of persons especially
when collected together.”).
15. See, e.g., John R. G. Dyer et al., Consensus Decision Making in Human Crowds,
75 ANIMAL BEHAV. 461, 463 (2008) (indicating that research on crowds was done using
groups of eight individuals).
16. See, e.g., CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS xix–xx (3d ed. 1932) (employing various characterizations, including:
nations, communities, millions of people, multitudes, and herds).
17. Stephen Reicher, Crowd Psychology, in AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
632 (Vilyanaur Ramachandran ed., 2d ed., 2012) [hereinafter Reicher, Crowd Psychology]
(“[C]rowds provide a particularly productive site in which to understand how people are
constituted and act as social subjects. Crowds . . . are critical to the formation of the
social identities and social relationships which regulate everyday life.”).
18. Stephen Reicher, The Psychology of Crowd Dynamics, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 185 (Michael A. Hogg & Scott Tindale eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Reicher, Crowd Dynamics].
19. See Reicher, Crowd Psychology, supra note 17, at 631; see also Reicher, Crowd
Dynamics, supra note 18, at 187–88.
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Under this type of definition, the crowd is a collection of people that
is to be feared—yet (as a result) in some ways respected.
The relative lack of definition of the concept of a crowd is a bit unsettling. As a phenomenon for study, it seems that crowds are most
meaningfully defined within a social, political, or economic context.20
[T]he behaviour of crowds will vary as a function of what categories are involved. The norms and values—and hence the
actions—of, say, a crowd of environmentalist protestors will be
different from those of a crowd of soccer fans which, in turn will
be different from those of a Catholic crowd welcoming the Pope.
The process of conformity to group standards may be general, but
the behaviours it leads to will always depend upon contextually
relevant belief systems.21

Accordingly, in studying crowd behaviors, it is important to understand something about the environment in which the crowd takes
action and the nature of the crowd members. Part II contextualizes the
board as a crowd. But first, it is important to understand some of the
thinking on crowd theory.
B. Theorizing the Crowd
There is a growing academic literature on crowds that is becoming
more and more nuanced over time. Moreover, popular commentary
has picked up on these scholarly works to synthesize them and make
the learning from them more available and accessible. The account
provided below, while incomplete,22 is designed to provide an accurate
foundation for the application of crowd theory to board of directors.
1. Early Crowd Theory
Early literature focused on the madness of crowds. In his book
entitled Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds,
which was originally published in 1841, historian Charles Mackay
provides readers with notorious examples of mad crowds—The
Mississippi Scheme, the South-Sea Bubble, the Tulipomania, etc.23
In his 1852 preface, he describes in florid language what he thinks
these historical episodes manifest:
20. Reicher, Crowd Psychology, supra note 17, at 633–34.
21. Id. at 634.
22. For more complete renderings, see DAVID L. MILLER, INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (3d ed. 2013); Reicher, Crowd Psychology, supra
note 17.
23. See MACKAY, supra note 16, at xxi–xxiv.
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In reading the history of nations, we find that . . . they have their
whims and their peculiarities; their seasons of excitement and
recklessness, when they care not what they do. We find that whole
communities suddenly fix their minds upon one object, and go mad
in its pursuit; that millions of people become simultaneously impressed with one delusion, and run after it, till their attention is
caught by some new folly more captivating than the first.24

Mackay goes on to famously note (with similar flourish): “Men, it has
been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in
herds, while they only recover their sense slowly, and one by one.” 25
By their nature, Mackay’s historical observations begged for
sociological and psychological study. Gustave Le Bon rose to the
occasion with his work, showcased in his book, The Crowd: A Study
of the Popular Mind, originally published in 1895.26 Le Bon, like
Mackay before him, focused most intently (although not exclusively)
on the crowd’s capacity to misbehave.27 He theorized that crowd madness (such as it is) spreads like an infection to susceptible individuals in the crowd—individuals who manifest or acquire, through
their membership in the crowd, attributes that they do not have
when acting outside the crowd:28
Different causes determine the appearance of . . . characteristics peculiar to crowds . . . . The first is that the individual
forming part of a crowd acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a sentiment of invincible power which allows him to
yield to instincts which, had he been alone, he would perforce
have kept under restraint . . . .
The second cause . . . is contagion . . . . It must be classed
among those phenomena of a hypnotic order. . . . In a crowd
every sentiment and act is contagious, and contagious to such a
degree that an individual readily sacrifices his personal interest
to the collective interest . . . .
A third cause, and by far the most important, determines in
the individuals of a crowd special characteristics which are quite
contrary at times to those presented by the isolated individual.29
24. Id. at xix.
25. Id. at xx.
26. LE BON, supra note 3.
27. See, e.g., id. at 6 (“Crowds, doubtless, are always unconscious, but this very
unconsciousness is perhaps one of the secrets of their strength.”); see also id. at 9 (“Today the claims of the masses are becoming more and more sharply defined, and amount
to nothing less than a determination to utterly destroy society as it now exists . . . .”).
28. Id. at 17.
29. Id.
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The bottom line, according to Le Bon:
[T]he disappearance of the conscious personality, the predominance of the unconscious personality, the turning by means of
suggestion and contagion of feelings and ideas in an identical
direction, the tendency to immediately transform the suggested
ideas into acts . . . are the principal characteristics of the individual forming part of a crowd. He is no longer himself, but has
become an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will.30

Alternatives to Le Bon’s theory emerged. For example, one group
of scholars effectively contends that, while crowds may behave differently—more aberrantly—than their individual members would
in the same circumstances, it may be that socially facilitated convergence, rather than contagion, is the cause of the changed behavior.31
Convergence theorists claim that people come to the crowd with commonalities that are heightened and reinforced by their crowd membership.32 Essentially, their work asserts that “[p]eople become crowd
members because they lack something already, they don’t come to lack
something because they have become crowd members.” 33 Although
it provides a different explanation for the madness of the crowd,
convergence theory, like Le Bon’s contagion theory, focuses on and
portrays crowds as negative social, political, and economic forces.34
Under these theories, individual crowd members lose their inhibitions,
if not their identities, when they become a part of the crowd.35
2. Contemporary Crowd Theory
Other scholars focused on emergent norms in the crowd—claiming that crowd behavior is determined by norms established among
the crowd members after they have engaged with each other over a
period of time.36 “The emergent norm approach is based on the view
30. Id. at 19.
31. See ALLPORT, supra note 4, at 295–300 (arguing against contagion theory and in
favor of a theory of the crowd based on social facilitation).
32. See id. at 295 (“The individual in the crowd behaves just as he would behave alone,
only more so.”).
33. Reicher, Crowd Psychology, supra note 17, at 633.
34. See ALLPORT, supra note 4, at 294, 313.
35. Id. at 312.
36. See CHALLENGER ET AL., supra note 6, at 95 (explaining that behavioral norms
become characteristic of a particular crowd after a period of “milling,” in which prominent
members of the crowd, known as “keynoters,” interact with crowd members); see also
Reicher, Crowd Psychology, supra note 17, at 633.
[C]rowds do not become homogenous entities in an instant. Rather, there is
an extended period where people mill about. They are addressed by many
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that the impact of groups on individuals resembles normative constraint rather than contagious mental unity.” 37
This view sees collective behavior as an emergent of interaction
processes taking place in periods when social controls have lost
viability and old values have come into doubt. The intensive interaction involved in milling gives rise to a heightened suggestibility
in which a common mood engenders new sentiments and conceptions of a situation.38

Emergent norm theorists presuppose that crowd participants do not
surrender their individual identities or objectives when they act in a
crowd; rather, they conform their behaviors to new norms that emerge
from the collective setting to serve those personal interests and
purposes.39 “[T]he unity of the crowd is often produced through the
interaction of participants who are actually behaving in different
fashions, and on the basis of different motivations.” 40
Modern crowd psychology study focuses much of its analytical
attention on a social identity model.41
The foundational assumption of social identity research is
that when people act as group members they shift from acting
in terms of personal identity to acting in terms of social identity.
That is, the eclipse of ones [sic] sense of oneself as a unique individual is not a loss but a refocusing of identity.42

The personal identity/social identity dichotomy emanated from work
done in small group settings by Henri Tajfel that led to the articulation of social identity theory.43 The social identity approach to
crowd theory combines social identity theory with self-categorization
theory.44 Importantly, while most theoretical accounts of crowd behavior focus significant attention on physical crowds (e.g., rioting

Id.

would be influence agents, or ‘keynoters.’ Gradually, particular keynoters
who are more striking than others begin to gain sway and norms begin to
spread through the crowd. Homogeneity, like normativity, is therefore an
emergent property of encounters among crowd members.

37. MILLER, supra note 22, at 31.
38. Joseph R. Gusfield, Book Review, 20 MIDWEST SOCIOLOGIST 55, 55 (1957) (reviewing
RALPH H. TURNER & LEWIS M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR (1957)).
39. See MILLER, supra note 22, at 32–33.
40. TURNER & KILLIAN, supra note 5, at 103.
41. See Reicher, Crowd Psychology, supra note 17, at 634.
42. Id.
43. Matthew J. Hornsey, Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory: A
Historical Review, 2/1 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCH. COMPASS 204, 206 (2008).
44. See id. at 204–05.
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mobs, attendees at sporting events) and physical behaviors (e.g.,
looting, vandalism), social identity theory “draws an explicit distinction between physical crowds based on co-presence (aggregates) and
psychological crowds based on social identification.” 45
Even from this condensed sampling, it is easy to see that the
academic approaches are distinct, yet compelling. Anecdotal experience indicates that they have descriptive, analytical, and predictive
power (although none alone are sufficient to describe and predict
crowd behaviors in all settings). Having said that, the relationships
between and among the various theories are complex; they overlap,
supplement, complement, and conflict with each other. Accordingly,
the learning is somewhat hard to put to practical use.
3. Pragmatic Synthesis
A bit more than ten years ago, however, a columnist for The
New Yorker, James Surowiecki, took on the task of synthesizing
crowd theory with other academic work in the area of group predictions and problem-solving in his popular press book The Wisdom of
Crowds.46 Specifically, Surowiecki’s book explains more precisely
why it is that crowds, contrary to Mackay’s and Le Bon’s depictions,
often make better decisions than the individuals in them would if
making the same decision alone.47 The book first identifies three
types of decision-making problems: cognition problems (which are
“problems that have . . . definitive solutions”); coordination problems
(which “require members of a group . . . to figure out how to coordinate their behavior with each other”); and cooperation problems
(which “involve the challenge of getting self-interested, distrustful
people to work together, even when narrow self-interest would seem
to dictate that no individual should take part”).48 Then, Surowiecki
posits three conditions to crowd wisdom, based on his research. Those
three conditions are “diversity, independence, and a particular kind
of decentralization.” 49
When Surowiecki talks about diversity, he is using the term
“not in a sociological sense, but rather in a conceptual and cognitive
sense” 50—diversity bred of different ideas and decision makers with
different experiences.51 “Diversity helps because it actually adds
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Reicher, Crowd Psychology, supra note 17, at 634.
SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 11.
Id.
Id. at xvii–xviii.
Id. at xviii.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
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perspectives that would otherwise be absent and because it takes
away, or at least weakens, some of the destructive characteristics of
group decision making.” 52 Surowiecki asserts that diversity is particularly important to wise decision making in small groups,53 and he
describes and cites to a study conducted by political scientist Scott
Page that shows that an intellectually diverse group may make
better decisions than a uniformly highly intelligent group.54
The point of Page’s experiment is that diversity is, on its own,
valuable, so that the simple fact of making a group diverse makes
it better at problem solving. That doesn’t mean that intelligence
is irrelevant . . . . But it does mean that, on the group level, intelligence alone is not enough . . . .55

Indeed, Professor Page’s work on diversity in complex systems both
supports and complements Surowiecki’s. Page contends that the benefits of diversity (which he categorizes as “inescapable”) originate from
two sources: averaging and diminishing returns.56 Averaging “refers
to the fact that if you have lots of types, you’ve got some insurance.”57
This is consistent with Surowiecki’s observations that diversity adds
perspectives.58 “[D]iminishing returns to type, refers to the fact that
in many contexts the marginal return (in productivity, profits, or fun)
decreases the more you have of a type.” 59 This benefit is similar to
Surowiecki’s contention diversity limits adverse attributes of crowd
decision making.60
Surowiecki’s reliance on the value of independence as a condition to crowd wisdom is, in part, founded on its symbiotic relationship
with diversity.61 Independence allows diversity to flourish and, in this
sense, is independence of judgment. “Independence doesn’t mean
52. SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 29.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 30.
55. Id.; see also SCOTT E. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY 9–10 (2011) [hereinafter
PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY] (“[D]iversity improves productivity for two rather
mundane reasons: averaging and diminishing returns to type.”); SCOTT E. PAGE, THE
DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BETTER GROUPS, F IRMS, SCHOOLS,
AND SOCIETIES 234 (2007) (“[F]or a crowd to be wise its members must be individually
smart or collectively diverse. Ideally, they would be both.”).
56. See PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 55, at 167.
57. Id.
58. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 29.
59. PAGE, DIVERSITY AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 55, at 167–68.
60. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 29.
61. See id. at 39 (noting that diversity helps preserve independence); see also id. at
xix (“Diversity and independence are important because the best collective decisions are
the product of disagreement and contest, not consensus or compromise.”).
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isolation, but it does mean relative freedom from the influence of
others.” 62 Suroweicki also cites two reasons why independence is
important to crowd wisdom: it prevents the correlation of group
members’ mistakes and it makes the generation of new information
more probable.63 He concludes that “[t]he smartest groups . . . are
made up of people with diverse perspectives who are able to stay independent of each other.” 64 In support of that conclusion, he cites to
behavioral work in a variety of fields (including sociology, social psychology, finance, and economics) that focuses on the downsides of a
lack of independence among group members.65
The third (and last) of Surowiecki’s conditions to crowd wisdom,
decentralization, relates to the structure of communication and other
activities of the crowd. According to Surowiecki, a diverse and independent crowd that operates in a decentralized manner is more likely
to generate a better solution to a problem.66 Decentralization relies
on and encourages specialization and independence and enables the
generation and use of a diverse set of inputs in decision making.67
Coordination is, however, required to ensure that these inputs are
aggregated and factored into the decision-making process.68 “Aggregation—which could be seen as a curious form of centralization—is
therefore paradoxically important to the success of decentralization.” 69
For example, various methods of averaging the numerical outputs of
individual decision-making in the crowd are forms of aggregation.70
Academic researchers cite to Surowiecki’s framework and continue to explore its validity.71 The model does some heavy lifting that
may be useful to us in thinking about specific crowds and the individuals that populate them. While he challenges the models of early
crowd theorists like Le Bon, he does not discredit their work entirely.72
62. Id. at 39.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 43–44, 49, 59, 65.
66. Id. at 70.
67. Id. at 71.
68. Id. at 71–72.
69. Id. at 75.
70. See Clintin P. Davis-Stober et al., When Is a Crowd Wise? 1, (June 29, 2014),
available at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1406.7563v1, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZX9-AHAB;
Jan Lorenz et al., How Social Influence Can Undermine the Wisdom of Crowd Effect 1,
(June 23, 2010), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/108/22/9020.full.pdf+html,
archived at http://perma.cc/UK4Y-NU7W; Pavlin Mavrodiev et al., Effects of Social Influence on the Wisdom of Crowds, Proc. Nat’l Acad. Scis. U.S. 2–3, (Apr. 16, 2012), available
at http://arxiv.org/pdf/1204.3463v1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/59LL-4DLR.
71. See, e.g., Davis-Stober et al., supra note 70, at 1; Lorenz et al., supra note 70, at
1; Mavrodiev et al., supra note 70, at 1.
72. SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at xvi–xvii.
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Instead, he contextualizes that work—cabins it to certain circumstances.73 His synthesis, therefore, provides us with useful new information in applying crowd theory in specific contexts.
C. Women in the Crowd
Each of the crowd theories described supra in Part I.B. focuses,
to some extent, on the identity of the crowd members. The theories
differ, however, as to whether individual identities are abandoned,
enhanced, employed, or converted. Moreover, none of these accounts
of crowd theory squarely engage any in-depth study or discussion of
particular, specified attributes of crowd members and their effects
on crowd behavior.
Of course, some researchers have undertaken crowd studies that
look at the characteristics of individual group members as a way of
enhancing our understanding of how and when crowd theory is a good
descriptor, guide, or predictor of crowd behavior. The gender of crowd
members is among those attributes studied. It would be impossible
(and no doubt counterproductive) to summarize all of the empirical
work on women as crowd members in this Article. Accordingly, this
subpart briefly summarizes key elements of that work.
Studies of gender and crowd behavior indicate that women and
men do behave differently in crowds.74 Specifically, a number of studies find that the crowd behaviors of women and men are consistent
with expected gender attributes (e.g., passivity and helplessness for
women and aggression and helpfulness for men).75 Also, women’s
keynoting behaviors in the crowd—a way of categorizing crowd
leadership or influence, generally defined as “making suggestions
as to how individuals in a crowd should respond to [an] ambiguous
situation” 76—are different from those of men.77
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., infra notes 75–77.
75. See, e.g., Webb et al., supra note 6, at 16 (“We found that clearly distinguishable
gender differences, generally reflecting conventional gender roles, characterized all of
the crowd events. In all of the cases, men engaged in more aggressive forms of behavior
than women.”); CHALLENGER ET AL., supra note 6, at 130 (“[A] qualitative examination
of gender differences in crowd behaviours across three different situations—prior to a
rock concert, prior to a sports event, and at a political rally—revealed that men engaged
in more verbally aggressive behaviour and were more likely to incite both violence and
forced entry into venues than their female counterparts.” (citation omitted)); id. at 145
(“[S]tudies of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire (1977) report that women generally
received more help than men, whilst more men than women offered to help and that
women typically offered emotional support to victims whilst men tried to fight the fire.”
(citations omitted)).
76. See Glossary, LIZABETH A. CRAWFORD & KATHERINE B. NOVAK, INDIVIDUAL AND
SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY G-526 (2013).
77. See Webb et al., supra note 6, at 15 (“[M]ale keynoting assumed more aggressive
forms than female keynoting.”).
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In addition, the crowd receives behaviors of women and men
differently. Studies indicate, for example, that men’s keynoting behaviors are more accepted than those of women.78 In one crowd
situation, both men and women who engaged in mocking behaviors
directed at outsiders were received differently—with the female
mocking being, at best, excused as inebriated conduct and the male
mocking attracting positive, even encouraging, attention.79 Again,
these observed crowd reactions are consistent with social and research expectations.
Although these and other similar gender crowd studies do not
relate to crowd decision-making behaviors, they indicate that institutionalized gender identity and roles are not abandoned when
people become part of a crowd.80 This finding is facially inconsistent
with principles espoused by early crowd theorists, including Mackay
and Le Bon, who posit that individual identity is abandoned or
refocused in the crowd.81 In addition, researchers reporting these
results note, among other things, that the persistence of gender roles
calls into question crowd theory that relies on “extra-institutional”
explanations for crowd behaviors.82 In other words, conventional
gender identity may survive and impact crowd membership rather
than being replaced by a distinct, collective, group-ordained identity
(whether resulting from contagion or convergence).
II. THE CORPORATE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AS A CROWD
This Article posits that crowd theory may be an interesting and
helpful way to gain new insights on the way boards of directors
operate and the roles that women play in them. That contention is
stronger and more likely to be successful if boards of directors can
be seen as crowds or as analogous to crowds in compelling, significant ways. An accurate assessment of the ways in which a board of
directors is like or unlike a crowd depends on the board’s nature and
operations.83 If a board of directors can be described as a group of
78. See id. (“Male keynoters received significantly more attention, and apparently more
positive sanctioning, than female keynoters from other crowd members.”).
79. See id.
80. See id. (“[W]e found, as have others, that institutionalized gender roles are maintained across a range of settings”); id. at 18 (“[D]ata highlight the endurance of gender
roles, and suggest that people rely on institutionalized cultural expectations when confronted with ambiguous situations.”).
81. See LE BON, supra note 3, at 9 (contending that a person, in becoming a crowd
member, “is no longer himself, but has become an automaton who has ceased to be guided
by his will.”); MACKAY, supra note 16, at xix–xx (describing the tendency of people to
adopt new behaviors in crowds).
82. See Webb et. al., supra note 6, at 17–18.
83. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 212–13, 222.
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people who can “act collectively to make decisions and solve problems,” then it can be seen as a crowd under the broad definitions
used by crowd theorists.84
Under state law, a corporation is managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.85 Accordingly, absent appropriate removal, restriction, or delegation of the directors’ power, the board is
the pivot point for corporate action.86 Board members typically take
action by resolution at board and committee meetings and in written
consents in lieu of meetings of the board and its committees.87 In
operation, the board’s decision-making process may be consensusdriven, but often is characterized by management dominance.88
The decision-making process for most corporations is not a
process of consensus. A cornerstone of consensus decision making
is that no member of the decision-making group is dominant or
superior to the rest. At most corporations, the decision-making
process, however, is dominated by management, particularly the
CEO, and not the board of directors.89

Even where the board’s decision-making process is not managementcontrolled, management frequently supplies substantially all of the
information used by the board in its deliberations.90
Directors, in their roles as such, are not agents of the corporation.91 The officers of the corporation and others are appointed—generally or from time to time—to enter into all or specified obligations
on behalf of the corporation.92 As part of its management authority,
84. Id. at xvii.
85. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2012); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b) (2013); see also CORPORATE LAWS COMMITTEE, ABA SECTION OF BUSINESS LAW,
Corporate Director’s Guidebook—Sixth Edition, 66 BUS. LAW. 975, 985–86 (2011) [hereinafter Guidebook].
86. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1607 (2005) (“The board of directors . . . is
endowed with plenary governance authority and is the body most centrally responsible
for the well-being of the corporate enterprise.”).
87. See Guidebook, supra note 85, at 1011.
88. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Informational Autonomy in the Boardroom, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1089, 1114 (2013).
89. Id. (footnote omitted).
90. See id. at 1115 (“[W]hen boards participate in the approval phase of decision
making, they are doing so based almost exclusively on the information and knowledge
obtained, screened, and then shared by the CEO and her management team.”).
91. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 86, at 1605 (“[N]either the board of directors as a body, nor individual directors, are agents of either the stockholders or of the
corporation . . . .”).
92. See, e.g., id. at 1605–06 (“[O]fficers, such as the chief executive officer, the chief
financial officer, general counsel, executive vice presidents, and many others, all are
agents of the corporation, the principal.” (footnotes omitted)).
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however, the board may direct the officers (and is charged with monitoring officer decision-making and other conduct) in the management
of the firm.93
Moreover, as managers of the corporation, members of the board
of directors—together with officers of the corporation—are charged
with fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.94 These duties generally
require that a director act in accordance with standards articulated
under state law when they oversee corporate affairs and make corporate decisions.95 Directors owe these fiduciary duties to the corporation, although some cases and commentary charge directors with
fiduciary duties to shareholders in addition to the corporation.96 Most
frequently, courts find that the duties owed to the corporation operate
for the primary benefit of shareholders, as the corporation’s owners
and, more specifically, for the financial benefit of shareholders.97
Yet even this formulation is ambiguous, since shareholders are not a
monolithic group.98 Suffice it to say, however, that the board acts in a
fiduciary or fiduciary-like capacity in relation to the shareholders
in managing the corporation.
A corporate board of directors is a collective.99 Although each
director has and must exercise his or her fiduciary duties individually, no single member of the board holds corporate management
power in and of himself or herself; members of the board must act
together to manage the firm.100 In their capacity as macro-managers
of the corporation, the directors jointly provide oversight, collectively
make decisions, and act together to solve problems for the corporation.101 Thus, the board of directors of a corporation appears to conform to the broad definitions of the crowd supra Part I.102 Surowiecki
expressly categorizes a corporate board of directors (as well as a jury)
as a crowd—a specific kind of crowd: a “small group.” 103
93. See Guidebook, supra note 85, at 986.
94. See id. at 982.
95. See id. at 990–92 (amalgamating and summarizing these state law standards).
96. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fiduciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491,
493 (2012).
97. See, e.g., Guidebook, supra note 85, at 985 (“Directors have a responsibility to act
in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. To do so, they must focus
on maximizing the value of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholders.”).
98. See Gold, supra note 96, at 493.
99. See Guidebook, supra note 85, at 981 (“[D]irectors exercise their decision-making
powers only by acting collectively, either as a board or as a board committee.”)
100. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002).
101. Id. at 9.
102. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at xvii and accompanying text; see also LE BON,
supra note 3, at 13–14 and accompanying text.
103. SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 175. He also uses the word “teams” to describe these
small groups.
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Consistent with this conclusion, corporate boards of directors
have been described, theorized, and studied as decision-making groups
or teams.104 Many works assume that the board is or may be treated
like a crowd.105 This body of literature lays a foundation for applying
crowd theory to the structure and operations of boards of directors.
III. WOMEN AND CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
Women are a relatively new addition as to the members of the
crowd of corporate directors. It was about 30 years ago that women
first became more noticeable on corporate boards of directors.106 However, evidence of women on public company and large firm boards
of directors extends back to the turn of the 20th century.107
As a result, studies of women on boards of directors also are relatively recent phenomena.108 Much of the literature bemoans—or otherwise remarks on—the lack of female directors on public company
corporate boards,109 or studies whether women make a difference in
104. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 100, at 2 (2002); Jay Conger & Edward E. Lawler,
Sharing Leadership on Corporate Boards: A Critical Requirement for Teamwork at the
Top, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE ORGS., 1 (2009), http://ceo.usc.edu/pdf/g08-11.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/F2CB-92PC; Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups,
24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 490 (1999); Samuel N. Fraidin, Duty of Care Jurisprudence:
Comparing Judicial Intuition and Social Psychology Research, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1,
4 (2004); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms,
and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797,
797 (2001); Nicola Faith Sharpe, Questioning Authority: The Critical Link Between
Board Power and Process, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (2012).
105. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence in the
Boardroom: Just How Far Have You Come, Baby?, 86 OR. L. REV. 373, 396 (2007) (noting
the application of social psychology, including Surowiecki’s work, to corporate boards);
Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2025, 2042–45 (2007) (noting the possibility for social cascades in board decisionmaking); Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY
L.J. 948, 952–53 (2008) (“The ability of the board to make good decisions is a function of
its ability to take advantage of the benefits of ‘the wisdom of crowds,’ the capacity of
groups to outperform individuals in making certain kinds of judgments.”).
106. See David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Pioneering Women on Boards: Pathways of
the First Female Directors, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES, 2 , Sept. 3, 2013, available at
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/35_Women.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/PPZ5-AYW2 (“Based on a sample of 68 respondents, we find that the average company
elected its first female director in 1985, 28 years ago.”).
107. Id. (noting that “Clara Abbott, wife of founder Wallace Abbott, served two terms
on the board of Abbott Laboratories from 1900 to 1908 and from 1911 to 1924—although
the company was not yet publicly listed at the time.”).
108. See Dalton & Dalton, supra note 7, at 258 (“Early discussions and data-based study
of women’s promise and roles on boards of directors are first reflected in the literature
over 30 years ago.” (citations omitted)).
109. See, e.g., WARNER, supra note 7, at 1; Dalton & Dalton, supra note 8, at 259
(describing existing research and stating, in sum, that “it has been noted that (1) women
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corporate performance.110 Some books and articles focus attention on
how women or corporations can change board composition to incorporate more women.111 The traditional news media, industry publications, and weblogs capture and digest much of this information for
public consumption.112
The data in these studies and published reports demonstrate a
number of things about women’s participation on boards of directors
in the United States. The number of women on boards of directors
has increased over the long term,113 but according to some, gains
are grossly under represented as inside directors of the board; (2) the path to becoming
CEO is often through inside director positions; and (3) women are thusly disadvantaged
in their candidacies for CEO”); Sabina Nielsen & Morten Huse, The Contribution of
Women on Boards of Directors: Going Beyond the Surface, 18 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN
INT’L REV. 136, 136 (2010).
Most previous research on women directors is of a descriptive nature and
focuses primarily on counting the number of women on corporate boards
and following the development of female representation on boards over the
years. More analytically oriented studies are mostly concerned with the
questions of why there are so few women on corporate boards . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
110. See, e.g., NANCY M. CARTER ET AL., THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
AND WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS, CATALYST 2 (2007); Niclas L. Erhardt et al.,
Board of Director Diversity and Firm Financial Performance, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE:
AN INT’L REV. 102, 104 (2003).
111. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 180 (2008); Jayne W.
Barnard, More Women on Corporate Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 703, 719–23 (2007); Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate
Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? 19–24 (Rock Center for Corporate
Governance Working Paper Series—No. 89, Sept. 2010).
112. See, e.g., Diane Brady, The Crumbling Case Against Women on U.S. Boards,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2014), available at http://www.businessweek.com
/articles/2014-04-17/the-crumbling-case-against-adding-more-women-to-u-dot-s-dot
-corporate-boards, archived at http://perma.cc/ZM5M-H46K; Boris Groysberg & Deborah
Bell, Women on Boards: Another Year, Another Disappointment, HBR BLOG NETWORK
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/02/women-on-boards-another-year-another-dis
appointment/, archived at http://perma.cc/G825-8XEX; Erin E. Harrison, U.S. Lags in
Placing Women on Boards as Investors Urge for More Diversity, INSIDE COUNSEL (Feb. 6,
2014), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2014/02/06/us-lags-in-placing-women-on-boards-as
-investors-ur?t=department-management, archived at http://perma.cc/5HTA-GVGN;
Barbara B. Kamm, Women in the Board Room: How to Increase Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.mercurynews.com
/opinion/ci_25384583/women-board-room-how-increase-gender-diversity-corporate, archived
at http://perma.cc/9FVL-B8JG; Mary Helen Martin, Special Report: Women Lawyers Bring
Added Value to Corporate Boards of Directors, DAILY REPORT (May 30, 2014), http://www
.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202656976257/Special-Report-Women-Lawyers-Bring-Added
-Value-to-Corporate-Boards-of-Directors?slreturn=20140615202013, archived http://perma
.cc/37BT-6V9W.
113. See Dalton & Dalton, supra note 7, at 259 (citing to evidence of equivalent growth
before and after adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); 2020 WOMEN ON BOARDS,
GENDER DIVERSITY INDEX 4 (2013) (showing gains in the percentage of women on boards
between 2011 and 2013).

2014]

WOMEN IN THE CROWD OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS

77

have slowed or are sluggish.114 Women comprise a minority of most
boards of directors, and some boards of directors are all male.115 Evidence of the effect of female directors on corporate performance is
mixed.116 Multiple alternative rationales for increased female presence
on boards of directors (other than positive performance effects) have
been advanced and debated.117 Yet, identifiable barriers exist to the
participation of women on corporate boards of directors.118 Most of
this is somewhat old news.
However, theoretical and empirical work has begun to concentrate less on issues of board composition and more closely on women’s
potentially distinct roles in board decision-making.119 This scholarship
114. See SOARES ET AL., supra note 9, at 1; Dalton & Dalton, supra note 7, at 259; see
also Barnard, supra note 111, at 708 (“Recent studies have shown . . . that at the current
rate of increase of women directors, it will take seventy years for women to achieve parity
with men on corporate boards.”).
115. See Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 142 (“[T]he mean ratio of women on the
boards is 12.8 per cent with values ranging between 0 and 66.67 per cent.”); SOARES ET
AL., supra note 9, at 1 (“In both 2012 and 2013, less than one-fifth of companies had 25%
or more women directors, while one-tenth had no women serving on their boards.”).
116. See, e.g., Rhode & Packel, supra note 111, at 4, 6, 8–10 (summarizing the results of
studies on the relationship between board diversity and corporate performance); WARNER,
supra note 7, at 3 (citing to various examples of the literature on board diversity and
firm performance); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on
Women Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579,
589–94 (2006) (describing various direct and indirect effects of gender and racial diversity
on corporate performance).
117. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 111, at 4 (“The ‘business case’ for diversity generally rests on two primary claims. The first is that it improves outcomes, particularly
financial performance. The second is that it improves decision-making processes, which
may in turn improve firm performance.”). Two researchers summarize several key rationales, other than positive financial performance effects on the firm, for including women
on corporate boards of directors:
Do women add unique value to the boardroom in other ways? Absolutely.
They provide unique perspectives, experiences, and work styles as compared
to their male counterparts. The addition of women to the boardroom, for
example, can greatly enhance the board’s deliberations. Women’s communication styles tend to be more participative and process-oriented. These
stylistic differences may enhance directors’ decision-making processes by
encouraging the board to consider a wider range of strategic options.
Women’s different experiences and perspectives may also help the board
consider a wider variety of customer needs and interests. Just over half of
the US population is female and women account for the majority of US
consumer purchases. Who better, then, than a female board member to offer
insights on the female customer?
Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, Women in the Boardroom: A Business Imperative,
24 J. BUS. STRATEGY 8, 9 (2003).
118. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 111, at 715–16; Rhode & Packel, supra note 111,
at 15–19.
119. See, e.g., Morten Huse & Anne Grethe Solberg, Gender Related Boardroom
Dynamics: How Women Make and Can Make Contributions on Corporate Boards, http://
www.boeckler.de/pdf/v_2006_03_30_huse3_f5.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4YXW-S9TS
(“We have seen through the perceptions and social constructions of the eight women
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explores numerous hypothesized contributions to board practices and
processes.120 These contributions include, for example, the possibility
that women bring different behaviors, competencies, or backgrounds
to the boardroom,121 that their presence signals diversity of opinion
or thought process both to those on the board and to those observing
the board’s activities from the outside,122 and that “women directors
may have a differential rather than uniform impact on the effectiveness in fulfilling theoretically distinct board tasks.” 123 These and
other innovations in thought and research that look at the role of
female directors in determining and executing board processes,
taken together with scholarship analyzing and treating the board as
a crowd (or team or group), motivate the observations about women
in the crowd of corporate directors made infra in Part IV.
IV. WOMEN IN THE CROWD OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS
By looking at corporate boards of directors through a gendered
crowd theory lens, we may gain insights that help us to understand
more about the unique and optimized role of women as members of
those boards. These insights may be useful in determining ideal
board composition and operating structures and processes. They
also provide a basis for additional theoretical and empirical work on
female board members and on board diversity more generally.
As a synthesis of crowd theory, Surowiecki’s work provides a useful framework for a crowd theory assessment of women as members
of corporate boards of directors. Accordingly, the analysis provided
below is organized around Surowiecki’s three principal conditions
to crowd wisdom: diversity of ideas and experience, independence of
judgment, and decentralization of activities, characterized by tactical
information aggregation.124 For each element of crowd wisdom, existing theory and research shed some new light (or at least provide a
new perspective) on women as corporate directors and the operation
of gender-diverse boards of directors.
directors that boardroom dynamics are not neutral to gender. Gender influences cognition
as well as behaviour.”); Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 143 (finding that “women on
boards influence key board processes, which in turn enhance or inhibit board effectiveness in strategic and operational control.”); Rhode & Packel, supra note 111, at 10–15
(describing three theories underlying claims that diversity enhances board processes).
120. See, e.g., infra notes 121–23.
121. See Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 137; Rhode & Packel, supra note 111, at
10–13.
122. See Rhode & Packel, supra note 111, at 13–15.
123. Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 137.
124. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 11.
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A. Female Directors and Diversity
Women provide gender diversity to boards of directors, and that
diversity may have specific, consistent value, at least for some corporations or on certain issues.125 Moreover, as Surowiecki mentions in
incorporating Scott Page’s work into his own, there is some demonstrable positive effect to adding diversity of any kind to a crowd.126 In some
cases, these observed effects of gender diversity indicate or reflect
diverse ideas or experiences.127 But those connections between gender
diversity and thought or background diversity are not guaranteed.128
Perhaps, then, women, qua women, are inherently or consistently different from men in ways that impact the objectives and
operations of corporate boards of directors. A key issue is whether
women bring to boards the requisite diversity of ideas and experience
to create and sustain crowd wisdom or at least avoid crowd madness.
Research offers evidence that women may bring game-changing perspectives and proficiencies to the boardroom.129 However, in choosing women that have opinions or backgrounds substantially similar
to those of their male colleagues (which is a distinct possibility, if not
an expected result, if director candidates are all chosen from the same
pools of people), a firm may limit or eliminate these ostensibly positive elements of diversity.130 In fact, women in corporate leadership
125. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 116, at 589–92 (addressing scholarly contentions
that board diversity may enable higher quality decisions, that increased gender diversity
on boards may constrain the negative impacts of harassment and discrimination actions,
and that gender diversity on the board may enhance a firm’s prospects in attracting and
retaining diverse employees and customers); Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of
Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 457, 494 (2002) (“[T]he
representation of women on corporate boards and at all levels of the corporate hierarchy
could work to eliminate insidious forms of sexual harassment that appear to be pervasive
in most corporate law regimes.”).
126. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 29–30; see also PAGE, DIVERSITY AND
COMPLEXITY, supra note 55, at 9–10, 167–68.
127. See SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 29.
128. Id. at 30, 36.
129. See, e.g., Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 137–38, 140 (listing various genderrelated differences in behaviors and skills that may be relevant to board membership
and participation); Rhode & Packel, supra note 111, at 10–12 (citing to evidence of different risk preferences, trust behaviors, work styles, life experiences, and decision-making
behaviors); Mariateresa Torchia et al., Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From
Tokenism to Critical Mass, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 299, 311 (2011) (suggesting that gender
differences and accompanying diverse experiences are likely to produce broader discussion
of issues, consideration of alternatives, and new information).
130. See, e.g., Rhode & Packel, supra note 111, at 13 (“The educational, socioeconomic,
and occupational backgrounds of women and minority directors tend to be quite similar
to those of other directors. Studies on the extent to which gender influences leadership
behavior are mixed, but some suggest that men and women who occupy the same role
tend to behave similarly.” (footnote omitted)).
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positions may be less diverse because they have chosen the path of
corporate leadership and may have to “reject feminine stereotypes.” 131
The evidence is, however, mixed.132
[S]ocial scientists typically claim that in management positions
such differences are minimized. It is believed that women who
pursue the non-traditional career of manager reject feminine
stereotypes and have needs, values, and leadership styles similar
to those of men who pursue managerial careers. Consistent with
the structural interpretation of organizational behavior, scholars
predict that men and women who occupy the same leadership role
will behave very similarly. However, others argue that gender
differences continue to exert some influence, in such a way that
men and women in the same organizational roles may behave
somewhat differently. Accordingly, reviews of prior research reveal
that whereas there are no overall differences in effectiveness
between women and men leaders, there are some gender related
differences for some behavior and skills in some situations. Hence,
these gender differences may affect not the general effectiveness
of the board but the performance of certain board tasks.133

Accordingly, the existence of distinct gendered attributes between
men and women in the crowd of corporate directors appears to be
situational.
Assuming, however, that women may bring different ideas and
experiences to a corporate board of directors, some question whether
they are able to maintain and employ those elements of diversity
over time. If women, as early crowd theorists might predict, leave their
individual attributes behind in joining up with the board crowd, then
one of the three core conditions for the operation of crowd wisdom is
lost. The literature is inconclusive on this issue.134
Some theorists predict that female corporate leaders have diverse
attributes that survive membership in the crowd and observe that
those traits may become group behaviors.135 Yet others caution that
131. Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 138.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See infra notes 136–39.
135. Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 138
From a team perspective, it can be expected that boards with higher ratios of
women directors will have characteristics and behavior typically associated
with women leaders. Such arguments are in accordance with upper echelons
theory, which postulates that individual backgrounds of executives influence
strategic choices made by the entire top management team and thus affect
team and firm level outcomes. The ratio of women directors represents a
central tendency of team (board) composition by aggregating individual
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important gender differences may be selectively suppressed or subverted by board structures and processes.136
[S]ome studies suggest that the influence of minority directors on
corporate boards is heavily shaped not only by the prior experience of the directors, but also the “larger social structural context
in which demographic differences are imbedded.” The failure to
include a critical mass of women or minorities may in some cases
prevent the potential benefits of diversity. Those benefits may
also be dampened by corporations’ well-documented tendency to
appoint women and minorities who are least likely to challenge
the status quo, or who are “trophy directors,” with too many board
positions to provide adequate oversight.137

Overall, it would be useful to policy makers, regulators, legal counsel,
and firm management to have a more refined understanding of the
contexts in which women corporate leaders exhibit, retain, and employ the diverse ideas and experiences that support crowd wisdom
when they become and act as part of a board of directors. The capacity for this kind of diversity exists, but its operation in practice
is uncertain.138
B. Female Directors and Independence
In identifying the corporate board of directors as a “small
group” form of crowd, Surowiecki gives us immediate concern about
the ability of board members to exercise independent judgment.139
“[T]he influence of the people in the group on each other’s judgment
is,” he maintains, “inescapable.” 140 But rather than take a wholly
negative view of this reality, he notes both a downside and an upside to this intragroup influence: “On the one hand, it means small
groups can make very bad decisions . . . . On the other hand, it also
means that small groups have the opportunity to be more than just
the sum of their parts.” 141 He illustrates his points about independent
judgment (as well as cognitive diversity and coordinated decentralized
decision-making) in small groups using a story about the deliberative process of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(director) characteristics to the team (board) level. Thus, gender diversity
can be used as a predictor of board level processes and effectiveness.
Id. (citations omitted).
136. Rhode & Packel, supra note 111, at 9.
137. Id. at 8–9 (footnotes omitted).
138. Id. at 9–10.
139. SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 176.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Mission Management Team with regard to the disastrous re-entry
of the space shuttle Columbia.142
Some scholars also examine whether the presence of women on
corporate boards of directors is likely to result in or encourage independent decision-making. One study, conducted through interviews
of Scandinavian women, indicates that women may prepare better
for board meetings, ask more questions, and rely less on the recommendations of corporate executives.143 Another study, conducted
in Canada, finds similar differences (as to inquisitiveness) in the
decision-making behaviors of male and female directors.144
The male directors scored significantly higher on the use of
normative reasoning than the females. This suggests that the
male directors in our sample study prefer to make decisions using
rules, regulations and traditional ways of doing business or getting along. Female directors, in contrast, seem to be significantly
less constrained by these same parameters and thus are more prepared to rock the board boat than their male counterparts. . . .
. . . [T]he women directors prefer to function using a significantly higher level of complex moral reasoning than the men.
This means that female corporate directors are significantly more
inclined to work through decision making by taking the interests
of multiple stakeholders into account in order to arrive at a fair
and morally consistent decision. They will also tend to use cooperation, collaboration and consensus building more often—and
more effectively—in order to make sound decisions. Their effectiveness stems from their predisposition to be more inquisitive
and to see more possible solutions.145

The researchers effectively conclude that female corporate directors
are effective independent decision-makers because they are inquisitive and have the capacity to identify different potential options.146
These studies indicate that women on boards of directors make decisions using inquisitorial processes that avoid the operation of certain
cognitive biases (such as confirmation bias and bandwagon effect),
groupthink, and decision-making heuristics (including information
cascades and other herding behaviors that impair or counteract independent judgment).147
142. See id. at 173–76.
143. See Huse & Solberg, supra note 119, at 13.
144. See Chris Bart & Gregory McQueen, Why Women Make Better Directors, 8 INT’L
J. BUS. GOVERNANCE & ETHICS 93, 96–97 (2013).
145. Id. at 97.
146. Id.
147. See id.
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In addition, a Norwegian study produced interesting findings
suggesting that female directors may be capable of having an indirect effect on the production and use of independent judgments in
board decision-making.148 The study finds that “women on boards influence key board processes, which in turn enhance or inhibit board
effectiveness in strategic and operational control.” 149 More specifically, “boards with high ratios of women are more likely to use board
development activities related to the introduction of working structures such as board work instructions, evaluations, and development
programs. These structures, in turn, enhance board strategic and
operational control.” 150 Accordingly, women may help ensure independent director judgments by fostering the adoption of board processes that limit the amount of influence individual board members
can have on the votes of other board members. Among other things,
this may mean instituting new operating rules that effectively prevent
or impede management domination of board deliberations.151 In this
way, independence is connected to the third Surowiecki condition for
the operation of crowd wisdom: decentralization.
C. Female Directors and Coordinated Decentralization
Decentralization, as a condition to crowd wisdom, provides the
optimal structure in which and processes by which crowd members
with diverse ideas and experience can exercise independent decisionmaking.
The idea of the wisdom of crowds also takes decentralization as a given and a good, since it implies that if you set a crowd
of self-interested, independent people to work in a decentralized
way on the same problem, instead of trying to direct their efforts
from the top down, their collective solution is likely to be better
than any other solution you could come up with.152

Decentralization is characterized by individual, dispersed (rather than
collective, concentrated) information gathering and decision-making.153
148. Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 145.
151. See Sharpe, supra note 88, at 1115 ( “[T]he board’s decisions are not substantively
independent, but instead a function of the CEO’s control and preferences.”).
152. SUROWIECKI, supra note 11, at 70.
153. See id. at 70–71 (In decentralized systems, “power does not fully reside in one central location, and many of the important decisions are made by individuals based on their
own local and specific knowledge rather than by an omniscient or far seeing planner.”).
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To be effective, however, decentralized crowd activities—and especially the generation of information significant to decision-making—
must be aggregated (i.e., collected and processed).154
At first blush, gender appears to have little relationship to this
important balance of decentralization and aggregation. However,
the Norwegian study regarding gender and board processes described
supra Part IV.B may provide a link here, too.155 Because the results
of the study indicate that “one of the mechanisms through which
women contribute to board effectiveness is the use of board development activities[,]” 156 those results suggest that female directors have
a potential role in establishing decision-making structures and policies
in corporate boards of directors that foster crowd wisdom. In other
words, women on corporate boards may have the ability to encourage
the board’s adoption of operating principles characterized by decentralization and aggregation. Among other things, these principles may
need to establish a deliberative culture that relies less heavily—or
at least non-exclusively—on senior management inputs.157
CONCLUSION
Scholars and others have theorized, studied, and written about
the role of, need for, desirability of, or case for increasing the number
of female corporate directors, the number of firms with female corporate directors, and the percentage of women on corporate boards of
directors.158 Although progress has been made in all respects, many
proponents of increased gender diversity have been frustrated by
the rate of change.159 Fresh ideas often seem hard to come by.
This Article is designed to provide a new perspective on women
as corporate directors. It applies learning from crowd theory to the
existing literature on women and corporate boards of directors to see
what, if anything, may be learned. Specifically, the Article focuses
attention on the ways in which women’s board membership and participation may contribute to the three conditions for crowd wisdom
that have been synthesized from crowd theory: diversity, independence, and aggregation.
154. See id. at 71–72.
155. See Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 143–45.
156. Id. at 145.
157. See Sharpe, supra note 88, at 1114.
158. See supra Parts III & IV and corresponding notes.
159. See Dalton & Dalton, supra note 7, at 259; supra note 10 and accompanying sources
and text.
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Two principal salient observations emerge from this exercise.
The first concerns the attributes that women may uniquely bring to
a corporate board that supports crowd wisdom. The second relates
to ways in which the advancement of board processes by female
directors may contribute to crowd wisdom.
First, while women may bring distinct ideas and experience to
boards of directors when they become board members, we do not yet
have a clear picture of the nature or extent of those differences or
how they may contribute to productive, efficient board decisionmaking. More empirical work—including interviews, surveys, and
other qualitative research—can be designed and undertaken to refine
and clarify the results of existing studies. This additional information may further inform board composition and operations.
Second, existing research indicates that women encourage productive board development activities—activities that may include, for
example, “the introduction of working structures such as board work
instructions, evaluations, and development programs.” 160 Because
wise crowds incorporate independent judgment and decentralized,
yet coordinated, information assembly and processing, women can
constructively promote board wisdom by suggesting or supporting
board structures and policies that incorporate or facilitate independence, decentralization, and aggregation (as well as other desired
operational policies and procedures).
The crowd theory analysis undertaken in this Article also
highlights the value of emergent literature on board processes and
dynamics. Especially valuable, from the vantage point of those studying and concerned about gender diversity on corporate boards, is the
portion of that literature that focuses in on optimizing women’s participation in board decision-making. As one pair of researchers notes:
[I]t is team processes and dynamics that have high explanatory
power for the results of board work. Thus, it is not only necessary to appoint women to corporate boards, it is also essential to
create favorable conditions for the board members to realize their
potential. By focusing attention on board development activities
and open debate while trying to minimize occurrences of conflict
in the boardroom, board effectiveness can be greatly improved.
Furthermore, as women directors may have differential impacts
on different board task[s], it is necessary to a priori specify the
nature of the board tasks and consider how appointing women
with certain qualities and characteristics can help improve the
board’s effectiveness in performing some of these tasks.161
160. Nielsen & Huse, supra note 109, at 145.
161. Id. at 146.
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This literature indicates that women have unique and identifiable
value on corporate boards of directors, a value that should be preserved and encouraged.
[W]omen will be most effective in the boardroom if they do not
try to model their behaviour after men. They will be more effective
than their male counterparts if they are simply authentic and
use their . . . talents to help their boards deal with the multifaceted social issues and concerns confronting them in these most
complicated and complex times.162

Thus, it would be counterproductive for women to follow the
crowd of corporate directors or to walk alone. Rather, as members
of the corporate director crowd, women can and do bring important
attributes to their participation and have unique and valuable contributions to make. These contributions are best made in the crowd
of directors under conditions that foster the diversity they bring to
the table, their ability to engage in independent thought and judgment, and the aggression of inputs from the thoughtfully constructed
decentralized decision-making processes that female directors may
support and champion.

162. Bart & McQueen, supra note 144, at 98.

